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Abstract:
Functional finance is only one of the elements of Modern Money
Theory (MMT). Chartal money, endogenous money and an Employer of
Last Resort Program (ELR) or Job Guarantee (JG) are often the
other elements. We are here interested fundamentally with the
functional finance aspects which are central for any discussion
of fiscal policy and have received more attention recently. We
discuss both the limitations of functional finance for
developing countries that have a sovereign currency, but are
forced to borrow in foreign currency and that might face a
balance of payments (BOP) constraint. We also analyze the limits
to borrowing in its own currency, and does not formally face the
possibility of default, since it can always print money or issue
debt. We note that the balance of payments constraint might
still be relevant and limit fiscal expansion. We note that
flexible rates do not necessarily create more space for fiscal
policy, and that should not be in general preferred to managed
exchange rate regimes with capital controls. We suggest that MMT
needs to be complemented with Structuralist ideas to provide a
more coherent understanding of fiscal policy in developing
countries.
Key Words: Modern Money Theory, Developing Countries, Balance of
Payments Constraint
JEL Codes:

1

The authors are Full Professor, Bucknell University, USA and Chief,
Financing for Development Unit, Economic Development Division, ECLAC,
Santiago, Chile, respectively. The opinions here expressed are the authors’
own and may not coincide with the institutions with which they are
affiliated. A preliminary version was discussed during a roundtable at the
Eastern Economic Association (EEA) Meetings in New York, in March 2019, and
presented at the New School Economic Department Seminar Series in September
of the same year. We thank without implicating to Gabriel Aidar, Matías
DeLucchi, Fabio Freitas, Josh Mason, Thomas Palley, Sanjay Reddy, Paulo dos
Santos, Franklin Serrano, Anwar Shaikh, Randall Wray, the graduate students
and other participants for questions and comments during that occasion, and
to Greg Hannsgen for his extensive comments to a draft of the paper.

Modern Money Theory (MMT) has become central to political
discussions. From a sociological point of view, it can be seen
as a hybrid of an academic school of thought and an activist
policy group. The dual nature of MMT, as a theoretical school
derived from some strands of Post Keynesian economics, mostly
associated with the work of Hyman Minsky and his disciple L.
Randall Wray, and a political movement connected to the more
progressive parts of the Democratic Party, to some extent the
result of the role of Stephanie Kelton as an economic advisor to
Senator Bernie Sanders, and to some market practitioners, in
particular Warren Mosler, creates a certain degree of confusion.
This is compounded by the differences between the adoption of
MMT principles in advanced or developed economies in the center,
and developing countries in the periphery. While we believe that
many propositions of MMT are essentially correct, we do believe
that some of the confusion can be clarified, by separating some
of the theoretical issues from the policy or activist views, and
adopting some of the concepts of center and periphery developed
by Structuralist authors, when analyzing developing countries.
Functional Finance, Chartal Money, and an Employer of Last
Resort (ELR) Program, now often referred to as Job Guarantee
(JG) program, are often seen as the main elements of MMT.2 We are
here interested fundamentally in the Functional Finance aspects
which are central for any discussion of fiscal policy, even
though part of the central argument to Functional Finance, and,
hence, MMT is that both fiscal and monetary policy are
intertwined.
This paper argues that Functional Finance is applicable to
developing countries, whether in the Tropics or not, to be
precise. Not only the issues raised by critics regarding the
risks of inflation in advanced economies are misplaced, but also
the fears of the implications about Functional Finance policies
in developing countries are often confused. In particular, there
is a disconnect between the issues of debt in foreign and
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Wray in the debate at the Eastern Economic Association meeting suggested
that Functional Finance was a late addition to MMT, and was not central to
their early arguments. Although that seems somewhat surprising, it is
important to note that Abba Lerner, a key author on Chartal Money, is also
the main author behind Functional Finance views.
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domestic currency. Functional Finance principles hold when
dealing with the debt in domestic currency, but that of course
does not mean that there are no limitations to the pursue of
fiscal policy, which is well known by MMT authors. But the
nature of the constraints is often misunderstood even with the
MMT literature.
We look, in the first place, to the limits to fiscal policy in
countries that need to borrow in foreign currency. We briefly
analyze the limitations of exchange rate depreciations, the role
of capital controls, and the issue of inflation and
hyperinflation. We then look exclusively to the issue of debt in
domestic currency, and under what circumstances developing
countries might have limits to fiscal expansion in domestic
currency.
In our view, these issues require some clarifications. In
particular, we believe that there is an overemphasis in the MMT
literature on the question of the choice of exchange rate regime
and the importance of a flexible regime and its effect on policy
space that is ultimately misplaced. The role of capital controls
is under analyzed, and the importance of the balance of payments
constraint is often neglected. We also analyze the limits that
are more specific to debt in domestic currency, which are
political in nature, but that are also associated to the
peripheral nature of developing countries. Our work builds on
the Post Keynesian traditions used by MMT authors, but we
emphasize the importance of Latin American Structuralist ideas
in order to clarify the limits to fiscal policy in the
periphery.
The limits when there is debt in foreign currency
Sovereign currencies are essentially currencies that are issued
on the basis of the power of the state, and are legal tender in
their issuing country. Sovereign currencies might be pegged to a
metallic standard, as many currencies were during the gold
standard, or to a foreign currency, as most currencies were
during the Bretton Woods system. Wray (2012: 42) suggests that
even though some developing countries peg their currencies,
something that he suggests constraints policy space, MMT
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analysis of sovereign currencies applies to developing
countries.3
Note that what constraints the policy space is not the choice of
fixed versus flexible or floating exchange rate, but the
necessity to obtain foreign currency, particularly the key
international reserve currency, associated to the needs to
import foreign intermediary and capital goods,4 and service debt
in foreign currency. Moreover, the accumulation of debt
increases the demand for foreign currency not only because it
leads to higher debt service obligations but also because it
increases risk perception as there is greater exposure to
currency mismatch. The available data shows that developing
countries, in particular general government and the especially
the non-financial corporate sector.5
The debt stock for developing economies as a whole expanded from
61 to 95 percent of GDP. For the same period, non-financial
corporate sector debt in advanced economies only grew from 88 to
3

In his words: “most developing nations adopt their own domestic currency.
Some of these peg their currencies, hence surrender a degree of domestic
policy space, as will be discussed below. However, since they do issue their
own currencies, the analysis here of sovereign currency does apply to them”
(Ibid.). We take this to mean that the principles of functional finance do
apply to developing countries, meaning that there is no default on domestic
currency. We used Wray (2012) as the main source for MMT views, but similar
views can be found in the more recent Mitchell et al. (2019).
4 Note that imports for direct consumption are more easily cut than
intermediary and capital goods which are necessary for production and growth,
if the economy is to expand, and, hence, integral to the functioning of the
economy. There is a long tradition within Latin American Structuralism, that
echoes classical political economy notions of how production is a circular
process, about the relevance of the role of imported means of production. See
for example, Rodríguez (2006).
5 This behavior is in line with the accumulation of debt at the global level.
Global debt has been climbing since the late 1990s: from 1997 to 2018 it rose
from US$ 74 billion to US$ 257 billion, 217 and 317 percent of world GDP,
respectively. This increase in global debt has several different features.
Mounting debt is a systemic trend, affecting developed and developing economies
and all sectors, non-financial corporate, government, household and financial.
Available evidence for 2007–2018 shows that debt rose from US$ 35 to 48 billion
for households, from US$ 35 to US70 billion for government, from US$ 54 to $ 65
billion for the financial sector and from US$ 43 to $ 74 billion for the nonfinancial corporate sector. It is clear that while government debt in domestic
debt is safe, this is not the case with private debt, and that systemic risk
sometimes forces the government to act as a lender of last resort. On the risks
on that front for sovereign countries, one has only to look at the experience
in the United States after the collapse of the housing bubble.

3

91 percent. The surge in non-financial corporate sector debt has
been shown to be a widespread trend for emerging economies. In
the case of the non-financial corporate sector, the available
evidence shows a sizable foreign currency component. The data
presented in Figure 1 shows that non-financial corporations and
the financial sector are the sectors with the highest percentage
of debt issued in foreign currency, 40 and 59 percent on
average, respectively, compared to 22 for the government and 4
percent for households.
Figure 1 - Total foreign currency debt, April 2019
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Source: Institute of International Finance (IIF), 2019.
In other words, it is the balance of payments that constitutes
the main limitation upon the policy space of developing
countries, and the choice of exchange rate regime would increase
or decrease policy space depending on certain circumstances.
This is not an issue between fixed and floating exchange rate
regimes, which is what one might think if one reads Wray (2012),
but whether there is or not a binding external constraint.6 In
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For example, in Vernengo and Rochon (2000) note on exchange rate choices
that Keynes was for a floating exchange rate at the end of the Gold Standard,
and was quite happy when the United Kingdom (UK) abandoned what he referred
to as a ‘barbaric relic.’ The idea was that the system forced the UK to
maintain higher interest rates that would be compatible with full employment.
However, during the negotiations of Bretton Woods, Keynes was for fixed
exchange rates, since capital controls, that he also favored, allowed for the
‘euthanasia of the rentier’ and lower interest rates would prevail. In other
words, the policy space, and the lower interest rates that were central for
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order to understand the problem it is necessary to discuss
briefly the idea of the balance of payments (BOP) and why it is
a constraint on economic growth in peripheral countries, and
idea that goes back to the ideas of Raúl Prebisch and his
followers at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), and that was further developed by Kaldorian
authors, like Wynne Godley and Anthony Thirlwall (e.g. McCombie
and Thirlwall, 1994).
The simple BOP accounting suggests that the balance of payments
is given by the following equation:
(1.)

−

+

+∆ =0

X, and M represent exports and imports, F represent the net
flows of capital and ∆R the variations of reserves of the
relevant reserve currency. For simplicity we assume that there
are no factor payments, so that exports and imports correspond
to the Current Account (CA) result, and that there are no
distinctions between portfolio and foreign direct investment
flows. In this case, a trade deficit is necessarily compensated
by positive capital inflows and/or variations in reserves. That
is:
(1’.)

−

=

+∆

This might be interpreted as suggesting that the CA is balanced
by the flows of capital and variations of reserves. Wray (2012:
130-31) suggests that this implies that there are no imbalances,
and, hence, exchange rate variations are not necessary to deal
with BOP problems. In his words:
“MMT supports floating rates to promote domestic policy
space – not to close ‘imbalances’… a current account
deficit is not ‘out of balance’ – it is balanced by a
capital account surplus. MMT makes no claim that floating
rates eliminate current account deficits, indeed, MMT does

fiscal expansion, could take place under both pegged or floating regimes,
depending on the circumstances.
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not argue that elimination of current account deficits is
even desirable” (Wray, 2012: 131; emphasis added).
By national accounting identities as shown in Equations 1 and
1´, in a given time period, say a year, a current account
deficit must be balanced by the sum of the financial account
plus changes in international reserves. But this does not
imply that a country can sustain over time any level of the
current account deficit. Although there are no strict current
account thresholds the evidence for developing countries
shows that the higher is the current account deficit the less
likely is that it is sustainable over time.
A simple exercise for Latin American economies considering
what is by historical standards a low and high current
account threshold level, 2.5 and 7 percent of GDP,
respectively,7 shows that few countries are able to maintain
over time a low level of a current account deficit and that
no country is able to maintain a high level of the current
account deficit. As shown in Figure 2 there is an inverse
relationship in both cases between the number of recorded
cases of current account deficits of 2.5 and 7 percent of GDP
and the number of years during which these deficits were
sustained.
In the case of upper bound of a 7 percent current account
deficit, 22 countries, were able to sustain this deficit
during the course of one year, 13 over two consecutive years,
four in the course of four consecutive years and none over
the course of five or more consecutive years. In the case of
the lower bound (2 percent of GDP, the data shows that 19
countries were able to sustain this current account deficit
during a year, between 12 and 14 countries were able to
sustain this deficit level between 2 and 4 consecutive years.
A minority of countries were able to sustain this deficit for
more than 4 consecutive years.

7

Note that the foreign debt to export ratio is a better gauge of external
sustainability, since it provides the actual ability to repay in foreign
currency.
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It is certainly true that, in any given year, and for whatever
current account deficit, no matter its magnitude, the balance of
payments deficit must be in balance in an accounting sense as
explained above. But as the above exercise shows this does not
mean any current account deficit is sustainable over time and
that as a result there is no economic problem to be dealt with,
and that can be ignored. Further, the notion is that even in the
presence of an outflow of capital, and possibly a loss of
reserves, there is no need for central bank intervention in a
developing country. This is more problematic, in a sense, since
most external problems are related to capital account issues,
and developing countries have to be very careful about the
possibility of capital flight. Again, in Wray’s words:
“… shifting portfolio preferences of foreign holders can
indeed lead to a currency depreciation. But so long as the
currency is floating, the government does not have to take
further action if this happens” (Ibid.: 121; emphasis
added).
While it is absolutely correct to argue, as Wray suggests, that
“… a government that spends using its own floating and
nonconvertible currency cannot be forced into default” (Ibid.:
131; emphasis added), that says very little about what kind of
default might be expected from this hypothetical developing
country. It cannot be forced into default on debt its own
currency, but it might be forced into a default into its foreign
obligations, and to avoid it be forced to promote contractionary
7

fiscal policies to curtail imports, and deal with the outflows
of capital and loss of reserves alluded above. It is not whether
it is desirable or not to eliminate the CA deficit, it is a
matter of need to do it, more often than not. It is a binding
restriction.
Warren Mosler is less careful in his discussion of the topic and
does not qualify the use of the country’s own currency. He
argues that: “Insolvency is never an issue with nonconvertible
currency and floating exchange rates” (Mosler, 2010: 97;
emphasis added). Note that clearly countries can default in
currency denominated in foreign currency, even with floating
rates. This brings us back to the issue of the exchange rate
regime.
The notion that there is no default, in domestic currency, does
not need the qualifier of the exchange rate regime. That is
always correct, and is worth noticing that Wray that correctly
emphasizes the domestic aspect, also insists on the floating
exchange rate regime. But even if default is not possible, as we
suggest, that does not mean fiscal policy is unconstrained. It
might be constrained by a CA deficit, if it is not possible to
finance it, or reserves are not available. A floating regime
does necessarily alleviate the problem, and it might make things
worse.
A Brief Digression on the Effects of Depreciations and Capital
Controls
Depreciation of the currency, as Wray notes may not do anything
to solve the CA deficit, but the notion that a government can
allow the currency to depreciate without intervention is a bit
puzzling, to say the least. An extensive Structuralist
literature, building on the work by Albert Hirschman, Carlos
Díaz-Alejandro, and culminating in a famous paper by Paul
Krugman and Lance Taylor, suggests that depreciations are
contractionary.8 This implies that depreciation, actually,
8

For a discussion of that literature in a Post Keynesian model of currency
crisis see Cline and Vernengo (2016). In that paper it is noted that if the
foreign debt (denominated in foreign currency) to export ratio is to be kept
from growing without limit, then exports must grow faster than the interest
on foreign debt. This is an extension of the traditional Domar sustainability
condition for open economies with foreign denominated debt.
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resolves the BOP problem, but by throwing the economy into a
recession, and reducing imports (M), when capital flows (F) and
reserves (R) are not accessible. This is why this proposition by
Wray seems misguided:
“What is important for our analysis, however, is that on a
floating exchange rate, a government does not need to fear
that it will run out of foreign currency reserves (or gold
reserves) for the simple reason that it does not convert
its domestic currency to foreign currency at a fixed
exchange rate. Indeed, the government does not have to
promise to make any conversions at all” (Ibid.: 161;
emphasis added).
The reason the government of a developing nation must be always
concerned with capital flows and reserves is not related to the
convertibility of its currency, but to the need to pay for its
short-term obligations in foreign currency, and even if those do
not exist, for its need to import essential intermediary and
capital goods that would paralyze the economy if they are not
imported. That is why the proposition that floating rates
provide more space for domestic policy should also be qualified.9
If the depreciation forces a contraction, there is no extra
space for policy, in fact.
And that is the reason why very few countries in the developing
world have truly free-floating exchange rate regimes. There three
main reasons for managed currencies. First, due to their production
and consumption requirements, inflation in developing countries
tends to be driven by costs rather than aggregate demand pressures.
Any depreciation of the exchange rate has a significant passthrough
effect on domestic process. Second, this can limit aggregate demand
9

MMT authors seem to suggest that a depreciated currency helps with the BOP
problem, even if they suggest it is not central, since it might ease the
external constraint. Mitchell et al. (2019: 390: emphasis added) say about
the risks of “strong currency appreciation” that: “rising exchange rates
[appreciation for them] can work against the development strategy because
foreign currency prices of the nation’s output rise relative to world
prices”, in other words, an appreciation would make their production less
competitive. The principle of substitution seems to work here. There is no
citation that we could find that suggests that appreciation could be good,
via its distributive effect, or that depreciations could be deleterious, and
have contractionary effects.
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expansion. A decline in policy interest rates means, unless outward
flow capital controls are in place, greater inflation. So interest
rate must be kept high to avoid depreciation. But also, a
depreciated
currency
and
lower
real
wages
might
reduce
consumption, having a contractionary effect. Third, depreciating
exchange rates can have significant balance sheet effects, the
more so the higher are external debt liabilities, and these also
can have contractionary effects.
Depreciation not only raises debt service costs, but can also
increase the value of the stock of liabilities by increasing the
local-currency value of outstanding debt. If the collateral for
the debt is likewise denominated in local currency, a currency
depreciation will result in a value loss of the collateral. In
such a situation, the collateral will no longer support the value
of the stock of debt. The end result may be a deleveraging process
or a greater demand for foreign exchange to balance asset and
liability accounts. In the case of the non-financial corporate
debt sector or even the financial sector, depending on its size
and importance in the market and the number of firms behaving in
this way, this type of behavior can result in an asset sell-off or
further devaluation pressures. In both cases the end-result can be
an increase in the value of the foreign debt stock. In the specific
case of the non-financial corporate sector the available evidence
indicates that beyond a given external debt leverage threshold
firms tend to contract investment.10
While depreciation would be more problematic than MMT authors
seem to anticipate, their discussion of capital controls is more
reticent. Capital controls do provide more space for policy, as
noted by Wray: “Capital controls offer an alternative method of
protecting an exchange rate while pursuing domestic policy
independence” (Ibid.: 129). However, the importance here is less
related to the protection of the exchange rate peg, as MMT
10

Higher interest payments, higher risk profile, which increases the
difficulty of obtaining funding, and the desire to repair weak balance sheets
and to build a buffer against illiquidity or possible default are some of the
factors that account for a negative relationship between leverage (debt) and
investment. Pérez Caldentey, Favreau Negront and Mendes Lobos (2018) apply a
nonlinear threshold model to a subset of 261 firms from Latin America
(Argentina, Brazil Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru) and find a negative
relation between cash flow and investment beyond a leverage (measured as the
ration between debt and assets) threshold of 0.77.
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authors presume, than the need of economizing essential hard
currency, the international reserve currency, to pay for shortterm obligations and avoid default, in foreign currency, and for
essential imports, when the former is not an issue.11
In this sense, there is a clear misunderstanding of the role of
the BOP constraint by MMT authors, both the more theoretical and
the more policy-oriented parts of the school of thought. The BOP
is an accounting identity, and it might not be always binding.
But the issue for developing countries is that they must import
essential goods for maintaining the economy functioning and
growing to incorporate the growing labor force, and, hopefully
reduce the gap in income per capita with advanced economies.
That implies that developing countries must be concerned with
reserves even if the currency is not convertible to gold,
dollars or other hard currency. Further the experience of Latin
America throws doubts on Wray’s conclusion, that we reproduce in
full:
“Most countries with fixed exchange rates and free capital
mobility would not be able to pursue Lerner’s two
principles of functional finance because their foreign
currency reserves would be threatened (only a handful of
nations have amassed so many reserves that their position
is unassailable). Managed or fixed exchange rates, with
some degree of constraint on capital flows, can provide
the required domestic policy space to pursue a full
employment goal, although matters are simpler for a nation
11

On the issue of capital controls Mosler is again somewhat less careful than
Wray. He is almost silent in his book, but on the jacket of Wray (1998) he
praises the book and criticizes: “… those calling for the abandonment of the
floating exchange rate policy and a return to fixed exchange rates, a gold
standard, or capital controls. The achievement of zero unemployment, price
stability, and a market economy for the long term as advanced by Wray is
viable only with floating exchange rates. As economic policy that clearly
does not understand the operation of floating rate currencies drives the
world into economic decline, the understanding of the principles advanced in
Understanding Modem Money can both halt the decline and lead the world into
an era of unprecedented, long term, economic achievement” (Mosler apud Wray
1998, jacket; emphasis added). Note the insistence on the flexible exchange
rate, and the critique of capital controls in the same breath with fixed
rates, and the gold standard (a specific pegged exchange rate system). The
fact, other than the quote by Mosler, there is no discussion of capital
controls in Wray (1998), which is surprising given the relevance of the topic
during the Asian and Russian crises at that time.

11

that allows its currency to float” (Ibid.: 214; emphasis
added).
Note that Latin America grew faster in the 1950s and 60s, like
most of the world, during the so-called Golden Age of
capitalism. That was a period in which exchange rates were
relatively rigid. Mexico, for example, maintained its exchange
rate fixed from 1954 to 1976 (at $12.50 pesos per US$ dollar),
when the infamous Peso Problem led a currency crisis, that is,
after the collapse of Bretton Woods. This is the same period of
what Mexican economists refer to the period of stabilizing
development, in which the economy grew faster than advanced
economies (Moreno-Brid and Ros, 2007: 136).
Also, exchange rates, everything else constant, are inversely
related to real wages, and, in part, the higher rate of growth
in Latin America during the Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) or State-led development period could be
associated to the combination of appreciated exchange rates,
which also allowed for cheap imports of machinery, and higher
real wages.
This insistence of the advantages of flexible rates, against a
more managed exchange rate system with capital controls, seems
similar to the so-called New Developmentalist school in Latin
America.12 There is a reason why at least some developing
countries have learned to accumulate significant reserves, in

12 For the New Developmentalist view see Bresser-Pereira (2016). Note that New
Developmentalists are somewhat conservative on fiscal policy, favoring some
degree of adjusting in order to avoid the inflation that would follow the
economy achieving full employment, as a result of a more depreciated
currency, higher exports and economic growth. There is an extreme optimism
about the effect of exchange rates. Wray (2012) shows less enthusiasm for the
ability of the exchange rate to solve BOP problems, but still thinks, as the
conclusion shows, that a floating regime is better than a managed regime with
capital controls. In our view, there is no way to guarantee a priori, which
system is better, but in many cases the latter would be preferable, and much
less to argue as Mitchell et al. (2019: 519; emphasis added) that a floating
rate is “a necessary condition for gaining policy independence.” They also
suggest that a “JG requires a flexible regime if it is to be effective
(Ibid.: 305; emphasis added), and given the importance of a JG for MMT this
implies that flexible rates are strongly preferred over managed rates with
capital controls.
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fact more than just a couple, and to intervene in foreign
exchange markets.13
Note that Wray seems to think that there is an evolution from
developing countries, that would move from a situation in which
managed float and capital controls would be acceptable, but
eventually they would graduate to a float without capital
controls. He says, using the case of China that:
“China will eventually be in a position where floating
would not only be desired, but would become necessary.
China will become too wealthy, too developed, to avoid
floating. She will stop net accumulating foreign currency
reserves, and will probably begin to run current account
deficits. She will gradually relax capital controls. She
might never go full-bore Western-style ‘free market’, but
she will find it to her advantage to float in order to
preserve domestic policy space” (Wray, 2012: 286; emphasis
added).
The notion is that all countries follow a similar path
towards free float and free capital mobility. It misses the
hierarchy of money, and the issues of why certain currencies
are used as international money (Fields and Vernengo, 2013).
A Brief Digression on Inflation and Hyperinflation
Our main concern with floating regimes and the possibility of
depreciations is not that it could be inflationary, which
certainly is the case, but with the ineffectiveness of the
exchange rate as a tool for industrial development, the
transformation of the productive structure of the economy.
Industrialization and structural change are necessary, since it
is the reduction of the import needs and the boosting of
exports, that reduces in a persistent way the developing
countries needs to borrow in foreign currency that lead to
13

This is essentially the same point made by Epstein (2019: 10), who argues
that: “there is a significant amount of empirical evidence that flexible
exchange rates do not fully insulate developing countries from the waves of
capital sloshing around the international financial markets, and that
flexible exchange rates will not create sufficient policy space for these
countries to pursue MMT macroeconomic policies.”
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cycles of boom and bust, with defaults in foreign currency.
These cycles could be seen through Minsky’s financial fragility
framework, and be compatible with many ideas from MMT, of
course.
The issue of inflation is the more traditional complaint about
MMT among not just mainstream critics, but also among heterodox
critics of their policy proposals. That is why an explanation
for inflation, and hyperinflation is relevant for MMT. Note that
there is no doubt that at full employment, fiscal expansion
would be inflationary. But considerably before they reach full
capacity, let alone full employment of the labor force (i.e.
developing countries have structural or disguised unemployment),
inflation becomes relevant in developing countries. Wray is
somewhat vague on the topic. He tells us that he: “will not
claim to fully understand the causes of hyperinflation, but the
Monetarist explanation sheds almost no light on the experience”
(Wray, 2012: 255). His explanation in his early book, however,
runs very close to the Monetarist explanation.14
Wray seems to indicate that fiscal issues matter, and is more
concerned with what he calls prudent fiscal policy, that some of
his critics give him and MMT authors credit for. He argues that
“The floating rate provides policy space that can be used by
prudent governments to pursue domestic policy goals with a
greater degree of freedom. History is of course filled with
imprudent governments. There is no substitute for good
governance” (Ibid.: 257; emphasis added). This suggests that
14 He says: “the belief that hyperinflations are caused by the government
'printing too much money', running the printing presses 'at full speed'
captures only the effect, not the cause of the problem. It is usually the
breakdown of the tax system, rather than the speed of the printing presses
alone, which creates the hyperinflation. While it may be superficially
accurate to call this a case of 'too much money chasing too few goods', this
does not identify the source of the inflation” (Wray, 1998: 85; emphasis
added). In other words, there is a breakdown of the taxing system, a fiscal
problem, in other words, similar to conventional Monetarist stories. In his
more recent work he seems to suggest that the problem is the fixed exchange
rate system. Again, the notion is that if there was no promise to convert
domestic currency to foreign at a fixed rate there would be no limit to the
ability to pursue fiscal policy. Again, the notion that even in a flexible
exchange rate regime developing countries do require foreign exchange for the
operation of the economy and, hence, may face an external constraint seems to
escape the analysis. For an alternative view of hyperinflation see Camara
Neto and Vernengo (2005).
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they do not emphasize spending at all costs or beyond full
employment. Note that he argues that a JG program is better, to
some extent than more conventional fiscal policy, because it
would be less inflationary.15
It goes without saying that depreciations are inflationary,
since they increase the prices of imported goods, and that often
is compounded by wage resistance, leading exchange-rate/wage
spirals that can get out of control. The alternative theory of
inflation, which was developed by Latin American Structuralists,
and that has origins in the German Balance of Payments School
and Joan Robinson is a necessary complement of MMT in order to
understand inflationary process in developing countries.
The limits to debt in domestic currency
Developing countries for sure also borrow in their own
currencies, and in fact, since the collapse of the dot-com
bubble at the beginning of the century, the international
environment has allowed for significant expansion of borrowing
by developing countries in their own currencies, and the
accumulation of significant amounts of reserves in dollars, the
international reserve currency. In this case, in debt in its own
currency the country certainly cannot default,16 as correctly
pointed out long ago by Functional Finance authors, and by MMT
authors more recently.
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This was suggested as a response to a question by one of us at the
roundtable at the EEA Meeting. We thank Professor Wray for this
clarification, but remain skeptical that more conventional fiscal policy
would be inflationary, or at least more so than a JG program. The reason for
that is that a JG could be supposedly more targeted to sectors in which there
are unused resources. In particular, it is unclear that JG would provide “a
nominal anchor against inflation” (Mitchell et al., 2019: 303; emphasis
added). Note that if there is a depreciation of the domestic currency, and
imported goods are part of the consumption basket of workers, then real wages
would fall, and wage resistance and demands for higher wages would ensue,
eroding the depreciation, and propagating the initial inflationary shock. The
JG wage would have to be adjusted, and would not be an anchor for prices.
16 It is clear that a government may choose to do so, even though it is hard
to see what would be the point of defaulting, when monetization or selling
bonds is always an alternative for the central bank. In any case, the
government of Argentina, under Mauricio Macri in 2019 did default in domestic
bonds in pesos. Our suggestion is that in this case the reason was political,
to frighten voters, after his defeat in the primary elections and before the
actual elections.

15

In order to analyze the dynamics of borrowing in its own
currency we develop an extended Domar like model of debt
dynamics, and provide a simple simulation of results with
reasonable parameters. The simple Domar model shows the dynamics
of domestic debt, which responds to the primary deficit plus the
difference of the rate of interest and the rate of growth of the
economy, times the debt-to-GDP ratio:
(2.)

=

(

)

+( − )

Equation 2 suggests that the growth of the debt-to-GDP ratio (ddot), depends on the primary balance as a share of GDP, where
variables have their traditional meanings (G, for spending, T
for taxes, and Y for GDP), plus the difference between the rate
of interest (i) on debt and the rate of growth of GDP (g),
weighted by the debt-to-GDP ratio. Note that, as the size of the
debt-to-GDP ratio becomes larger, the second component, that is,
the one that depends on the difference between the rate of
growth of debt, represented by the interest rate, versus the
rate of growth of the ability to pay, which in domestic currency
depends on the growth of the economy, becomes the dominant one.17
This result suggests that the bias of MMT authors for relatively
lax monetary policy with low interest rates is particularly
important when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high.18
We additionally assume that government spending growth
determines output growth through a simple multiplier process,
and that taxes grow with the growth of the economy:
(3.)

=

17 Josh Mason noted in the roundtable at the EEA that this is essentially a
similar result as the one derived in a paper of his. See Mason and Jayadev
(2018).
18 Low interest rates seem appropriate in these conditions. We will discuss
situations in developing countries in which high rates are necessary. A
different and more problematic notion associated to some MMT authors, in this
respect, is the supposition that there is a natural rate of interest, and
that it is zero. See Forstater and Mosler (2005). It is worth noticing that,
in our view, the normal rate can actually be any rate that the social
conditions and the pressures imposed on the monetary authorities would
permit.
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Where α is the multiplier and γ is the rate of growth of
autonomous government spending. And finally:
(4.)

=

Where τ is the growth of tax revenue, β is a coefficient and
taxes grow proportionally with GDP. Now the rate of growth and
the primary balance have been endogenized, and only government
spending and the rate of interest are exogenous. Exogenous
fiscal and monetary policy are associated to autonomous spending
and the setting of the rate of interest, and monetary policy is
important because it set limits to how much it can be borrowed
(and how much it would cost to service the outstanding debt).
Figure 3 - Burden of Interest/Simulations
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Under reasonable assumptions, with relatively high interest
rates, somewhat normal, but not small or large, multiplier, low
effect of growth on taxes (i=0.1; α=0.5, β=0.5) it is possible to
have not only, as in the Domar model that the debt-to-GDP ratio
increases exponentially, but also the interest rate burden,
meaning the interest payments as a share of taxes, increases
significantly. In the simple simulation, even with debt-to-GDP
at low levels (15 percent), the share of interest payments on
total revenue grows rapidly to about 30 percent of tax revenue.
In other words, even if the debt-to-GDP ratio is not growing
excessively, the burden of debt grows relatively fast. That is
more problematic than the increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Graphs in Figure 3 show the dynamics of the main variables in
the simulation.
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Note that there is no real problem with financing the debt, and
taxes are certainly not financing spending, not only because
causality goes from spending, in this case exogenous government
spending, to revenue, as the logic of effective demand would
require, but also because all taxes are the result of the
growing economy in this simplified model. Of course, no
government can spend more than 100 percent of its tax revenue on
servicing its own debt. But limits should set in well before
that, and it is important to notice that there are limits to how
much a government can push up, politically speaking, the
interest rate burden. There is nothing here that makes
Functional Finance, or MMT, principles inoperative. It is still
true that countries do not default in their own debt, and that
government spending generates income, and, hence, tax revenue.
There are distributive issues, and the limits to government
action are mostly political in nature. Interest payments are
mostly to banks, corporations and the wealthy individuals that
hold public debt. In other words, there are clear political
limits to the expansion of the interest rate burden. The
political economy of the conflict would depend on who carries
the burden of taxation, that in this story fundamentally
benefits financial rentiers,19 since when the burden of interest
is high, a significant amount of government revenue ends up in
their hands.
It should be noted that in the historical case of England in the
18th century, when debt-to-GDP reached high levels, at about 260
percent, one of the important ways in which the British were
able to out-finance the other major European powers,
fundamentally France, was the ability to borrow long-term at low
rates. This is not precisely the case of a developing country,
but it might be a useful example, since the UK was not the
hegemonic country yet, its debt was convertible to gold, at
least after the famous mistake by Sir Isaac Newton which put its
economy on a de factor gold standard (Eichengreen, 1996). Brewer
19 There is always the option of taxing rentiers. The political economy
aspects of taxation have not been discussed in great detail by MMT authors.
In part, perhaps, because there are differences between the school of
economic thought and the political activists within MMT, with Mosler (2019)
being explicitly against taxation of income, both for families and
corporations.
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(1988: 119) suggests that a large part of the UK debt was funded
debt, i.e. it was debt for which specific taxes were set aside
to service it, and it tended to be long-term, while unfunded
debt was usually short-term debt. Debt service consumed a great
amount of the budget, but that was simply the result of the
incredibly large amount of debt, since interest rates remained
relatively low. Here the role of the central bank is crucial,
since it can affect, if it wishes to, the interest rate on
public debt. There are a few historical examples of that, with
the United States (US) during the Great Depression and World War
II, just before the Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951, being the most
prominent.20
In the British case, in an economy that was not yet hegemonic,
or at least not completely so, emerging from a dispute with the
Dutch for the access to long distance trade in Asia, and in a
more direct dispute with France, borrowing was in bonds, that
were ultimately redeemable in a metallic standard. Therefore, it
is clear that default was possible, and to some extent tied to
military fortunes. Note that in this context providing
guarantees about the ability to service the debt was crucial.
Taxes were central not because they funded spending, but because
the stream of future taxes guaranteed the payment of interest to
the rentiers. Essentially a process of redistribution that
favored financial markets. Higher taxation on the wealthy could
compensate for the inequality caused by a high burden of
interest payments, when the accumulation of debt is in domestic
currency. Wray (2012: 146) argues that: “MMT is not opposed to
using taxes on high incomes and high wealth in an attempt to
reduce inequality.” And he suggests eliminating Treasury
securities that benefits rentiers as a possible measure for
reducing inequality (Ibid.).21
20 The Federal Reserve under Marriner Eccles guaranteed a rate of 2.5 percent
on long-term bonds for US long-term bonds. Similarly, Quantitative Easing
(QE) can be seen as a policy effected to try to reduce long-term interest
rates. See Vernengo (2009).
21 Here again the differences between the practioner side and the more
academic side of MMT become apparent, with Mosler (2019) suggesting in a
presentation at the New School that he would favor eliminating the personal
and corporate income taxes, and sales taxes too. Note that in that respect,
Wray has a somewhat mixed message, and has said in an interview that he was:
"'a bit disappointed' that Ocasio-Cortez connected tax hikes to the Green New
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Figure 4 – Burden of Interest (% expenses)/Caribbean Small States and US
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However, for developing countries there are circumstances that
the interest burden becomes high, and it might be harder and
even counter-productive to reduce it. This is the case of small
countries in the Caribbean, for example. High real interest
rates are a necessary tool to attract capital flows, and deal
with poor export performance. The high interest rates, not only
cause a relatively burden of interest payments (see Figure 4),
but in addition they create the political conditions for forcing
austerity policies.22 Even if the higher spending is financial,
local governments, often dependent from international
institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and US
ones like the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) tend to be pressured to reduce fiscal deficits. In this
case, it is less the dispute between rentiers and those with

Deal” (apud Coy and Dmitrieva, 2019; emphasis added). In other words, there
is a certain reluctance when it comes to the policy prescriptions to support
higher taxes, even when this are higher taxes on the wealthy that would have
a positive effect on distribution, and more importantly would create
political support for the policy at hand.
22 One of the most important consequences of debt accumulation is that the
government’s role is divorced from the provision of public goods, including
health, educations and pensions, and services and from functional finance.
The government spends its resources in managing its debt. In the case of
Jamaica, for example, more than 70 percent of the government´s expenditure is
spent on debt management.
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interests in productive activities that clash. The role of
developed country’s institutions in forcing a certain political
agenda affects fiscal policies.
Here again the problems of not issuing a reserve currency even
if it is a sovereign currency that is not pegged to the reserve
currency become relevant. Developing countries might be forced
to have higher domestic interest rates to preclude capital
flight. Still it is possible to do expansionary fiscal policy,
of course, unless the BOP constraint was reached, but with
higher interest rates, if society is willing to accept the
higher interest rate burden and the fiscal transfers to rentiers
that it entails. In other words, the interest burden of debt in
domestic currency is tied to the external constraint and the
need to attract capital, or at least prevent capital flight,
even when debt is in domestic currency. In this sense, we think
that Mitchell et al. (2019: 555; emphasis added) are not
entirely correct when they argue that: “With a floating exchange
rate, the interest rate target can be set to be consistent with
domestic policy goals”, by which they mean fundamentally full
employment.
The limitations of interest rate policy in developing countries
can be seen in the interest rate burden, which is persistently
higher, for example, for the small Caribbean countries than for
the United States (Figure 4). This certainly does not imply that
expansionary fiscal policy is impossible in developing
countries. It suggests that the political economy of it is
considerably more complex than even MMT authors tend to
understand, and having debt in the countries own currency, with
a floating currency, might not be sufficient to push back on the
enforcement of higher rates of interest, in a world with high
mobility of capital, and international organizations pushing for
austerity.
This is true of even larger developing nations, that would have
a higher degree of autonomy than the small Caribbean nations
discussed above. The political economy of the Brazilian case
might be of interest to illustrate our point. After
stabilization in the mid-1990s Brazil maintained very high real
rates of interest, often among if not the highest in the world.
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This obviously implied a high interest burden, as can be seen in
Figure 5. The Brazilian government in the period shown had for
the most part, other than at the end of the series, primary
surpluses, and nominal fiscal deficits, and that difference is
essentially the financial burden of public debt. For the period
the average corresponds to about 6.2 percent of GDP, and that
huge transfer to the owners of public bonds, is what corresponds
to the large share of interest payments on total government
spending.
Figure 5 – Burden of Interest (% expenses)/Brazil
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The question one might ask is why a left-of-center government,
like the ones led by both Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and his
successor, Dilma Rousseff, would maintain such a large transfer
to the relatively wealthy, which would be many times larger than
the most famous of the social transfer programs, the Bolsa
Família program. Note that the Worker’s Party administration did
in fact use redistributive policy to reduce inequality, like a
policy of increasing the minimum wage, and that inequality fell
in Brazil, and, indeed, in the whole of Latin America and no
other world region during the 2000s, in part because similar
policies were pursued by other left-of-center governments during
the so-called Pink Tide (Cornia, 2014).
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There are at least two reasonable answers to that question, in
our estimation. First, high interest rates were necessary to
attract capital flows and accumulate international reserves.
This also was instrumental in keeping the exchange rate under
control, and with that checking the inflationary pressures that
could ensue from both persistent depreciation and higher wages.
Second, and perhaps more speculatively, they needed to keep
rentiers within the electoral coalition, or at least not overtly
in revolt, and maintain political stability.23 It is clear that
guaranteeing a stable remuneration for rentiers was central for
early central banks, like the alluded case of the UK in the 18th
century.
Figure 6 – US real base rate and Brazilian Foreign Reserves
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Arguably, the strategy in Brazil backfired. Protests in 2013, by
essentially low-income groups concerned with high cost of urban
transportation spread to middle class protests, and by 2015, the
industrial and financial interest groups were openly criticizing
the government, and demanding, somewhat inconsistently, for
fiscal adjustment. But, from our perspective, the important
issue is that Brazil did accumulate significant amounts of
foreign reserves, and that precluded an external crisis,
23

Here we contradict, to some extent, the excellent analysis of Boito (2018)
on the role of financial interests and the collapse of PT’s government in
2015 and 2016.
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something that took place, for example, in neighboring
Argentina. As shown in Figure 6, as the real rates in the United
States became negative, and real rates remained positive in
Brazil, there was a significant accumulation of reserves. In
other words, high interest rates in this particular case were
instrumental in creating fiscal space, even if the
redistributive effects were fundamentally negative, and had to
compensated by social transfers and policies to increase formal
jobs increasing real wages.
Concluding remarks
Modern Money Theory is, to some extent, an offshoot of Post
Keynesian economics, that has become increasingly popular.24 We
share many of the same preoccupations and principles and most of
their conclusions. However, we do believe that some
clarifications regarding the role of the external constraint,
exchange rate regimes, the use of capital controls, the
relevance of reserves and the political economy of spending and
taxation are important when dealing with developing countries.
These are seen as necessary refinements of the argument needed
to understand functional finance in developing countries.
Here are some MMT arguments that need some qualification in our
view:
The notion that a government that spends its own floating
and currency cannot be forced into default in that currency
is correct, but it can still default in foreign currency,
and might be forced into austerity policies in order to
reduce external imbalances. So even without defaulting
there is a limit to the expansion of debt in domestic
currency;
A government should be concerned that it might run out of
foreign currency reserves even if it does not convert its
domestic currency to foreign currency (or gold), simply
because it must obtain foreign reserves to pay at least for
24 We were somewhat surprised by Wray’s comment, at the EEA meeting, that MMT
authors were kicked out of Post Keynesian economics. Not just for the obvious
reason that nobody has that authority, and we certainly think that many of
his ideas remain firmly Post Keynesian, but also, because he is one of the
coeditors of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, the prime journal of
that school of thought.
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essential intermediary and capital goods. This is
compounded by the needs to service debt in foreign
currency, and for that reason that should be kept to a
minimum whenever it is possible;
It is not clear that floating or flexible exchange rate
regimes are always preferable to managed or fixed exchange
rates complemented by some type of capital controls, even
in the more open world of the floating dollar standard in
the post-Bretton Woods era.25 Flexible rates are both
inflationary and contractionary, and the exchange rate has
distributive effects, that may imply that under certain
conditions a stable an appreciated exchange rate could be
conducive to higher growth;
Hyperinflations tend to occur because countries do need to
make payments in foreign currency, be that for the needs of
development, the requirements of war, or simply by the
imposition of foreign powers (e.g. reparations), and are
not connected to problems with the tax system, let alone
the central bank printing press. That is an additional
reason to be concerned with floating exchange rate regimes
and the amount of reserves kept by the central bank;
If debt denominated in foreign currency is to be kept under
control, to preclude an external crisis that forces
austerity at home (to reduce essential imports), then
exports must grow faster than the interest on foreign debt.
The structure of imports and exports is central for the
fiscal space of a developing country. Geopolitical factors
become relevant in this respect, since access to export
markets and to foreign finance in hard currency are
controlled by hegemonic countries;
While it is true that there is no default in domestic
currency, the political economy of spending and taxing
matters. This is true in advanced economies, but certainly
even more so in developing countries. In advanced economies
it is often a question of who benefits, and crucially a
political limitation. In developing economies, the external
25 It must be clear that we do not believe that there is any significant
chance that there will be a change in the near future in the flexible dollar
standard, and that we do not advocate any return to a fixed exchange rate
regime for the international monetary system. On the persistence of the
flexible dollar standard see Fields and Vernengo (2013).
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constraint and the need to avoid capital flight and
accumulate hard currency is paramount.
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